Is New Testament Theology Trinitarian?

Today I had an extended dialogue with apologist Dane Van Eys on the above question. It was livestreamed for the Real Seekers and Faith Unaltered podcasts. I think it was a productive and friendly conversation. We ranged over logical, theological, historical, and biblical topics.

Below the video are my notes about identity problems and historical problems for Trinity theories that I all-too-quickly presented. I purposely took a different angle here than in my recent debate with James White, presupposing that the listener is willing to think carefully about identity claims.

Assumptions:

• We should carefully use our God-given common sense in interpreting the Bible.
• All contradictions are false.
• Appearance of incoherence is strong evidence of falsehood.
• Contradiction-implying readings of the Bible should be an absolute last resort.

Logical properties of the relation numerical identity (=), or being numerically the same thing as.

• Necessarily reflexive: for any a, a = a.
  • Some relations can be reflexive or not: I can make fun of you, but I can also make fun of myself. So the making fun of relation can obtain between two things, or between a thing and itself.
  • In contrast, the numerical identity relation can only obtain between a thing and itself.
• Symmetrical: if a = b then it follows that b = a.
  • This means it can’t be that a = b and yet it is false that b = a.
• Transitive: if a equals b, and b = c then it follows that a = c.
  • It is like many other relations in this way, such as the bigger than relation.
• Forces absolute indiscernibility: when a = b that means that and b are one and the same thing and so a and b cannot differ in any way.
  • It is self-evident that some one thing can’t be and not be a certain way (in the same way, at the same time).
  • Of course, we know that things change over time–I’m taller than I was in 1980–but at any given time, if a and b are one and the same, then a and b can’t differ in any way.
  • This means that any simultaneous difference (no matter how small)  proves non-identity (numerical distinctness).

In this sense of “identity” the NT assumes and implies the identity of the Father with the one God. (I think we agree about this.)

Trinitarians assert that each of the Persons “is God.”

Are they thereby identifying each Person with the one God?

It depends! (See my “Trinity” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.)

But if they argue like this for the “deity” of each, they are asserting numerical identity, whether they recognize it or not!

1. Only God is A.
2. Jesus is A.
3. Therefore, Jesus is God.

This is a valid argument (the premises imply the conclusion).

But the logical form of the premises implies that the conclusion is an identity statement (assertion of numerical sameness). Here is a logical partial translation that reveals the hidden structure of 1.

1. For any x, if x is A, then x = g.
2. j is A.
3. Therefore j = g.

Here are some applications of these insights about identity statements to Trinity theories.

1. Some Trinity theories commit to f = g and s = g. Theological disaster logically follows. In other words, this is a valid argument:

1. f = g                         trinitarian premise
2. s = g                         trinitarian premise
3. g = s                         (2, symmetry of =)
4. f = s                         (1,3, transitivity of =)

(Or just: things identical to the same thing must be identical to one another.)

4 is

• a claim any Trinity theory must deny
• an expression of heretical modalism
• contradicted by the NT, which teaches f-s differences.

But 4 is implied by 1 & 2!

2. If, e.g. s = g then it follows that s and g can’t differ in any way!

But the trinitarian also holds that g is tripersonal while the s is not tripersonal, which implies s ? g.

This also helps us to see how trinitarian orthodoxy clashes with NT teaching.

1. g = t                core trinitarian claim
2. f ? t                 implied by f-t qualitative differences
3. f ? g                (1,2 – replacing t with g, since they’re = according to 1)

This clashes with the New Testament teaching that f = g, e.g. John 17:1-3, 1 Corinthians 8:6, the greetings in all the Pauline letters.

One way to see this clear teaching f = g, and the clash with Trinity theories:

1. f is the god of j.       Many clear texts, e.g. Rev 3:12, John 20:17, Eph 1:17
2. t is a god.                 Implied by core trinitarian claim: t is the god.
3. There is only one god.    Monotheism: taught in many OT & NT texts.

As I will show, these three premises imply a contradiction; thus, at least one of 1-3 is false; thus, a Christian must deny at least one of 1-3.

1. f is the god of j.       Many clear texts, e.g. Rev 3:12, John 20:17, Eph 1:17
2. t is a god.                 Implied by core trinitarian claim: t is the god.
3. There is only one god.    Monotheism: taught in many OT & NT texts.
4. f is a god.                 (from 1)
5. The one god is both tripersonal and not tripersonal. (2-4)
6. At least one of 1-3 is false.   (from 1-5)

Which should a Christian deny?

1. f is the god of j.       Many clear texts, e.g. Rev 3:12, John 20:17, Eph 1:17
2. t is a god.                 Implied by core trinitarian claim: t is the god.
3. There is only one god.    Monotheism: taught in many OT & NT texts.

It’s a clear-cut case of Scripture (1,3) vs. post-biblical tradition (2). Therefore, a Protestant should deny 2.

Is belief in a tripersonal god a post-biblical tradition?

Both NT studies and the history of theology tell us that the answer is Yes.

No NT term or phrase was then understood to refer to a tripersonal god, e.g. theos.

In the 100s and 200s there were plenty of speculations about Jesus’ pre-human existence, and his being divine in some way or other.

But they still had no term for a tripersonal god – not even trias (Greek) and trinitas (Latin). Each of those was used only as a plural referring term, for the one god plus two other beings. (compare: the gang)

Mainstream Christian theology c. 230, the heyday of Origen (Alexandria, then Caesarea) and Novatian (Rome): three groups in the (non-gnostic) mainstream,

• Logos theorists: f = g, s (or l) & h lesser “divine” beings, a.k.a. lesser gods
• Modalistic monarchians: f = s (and = h?)
• Dynamic monarchians: f = g, s a man in whom g/f worked by his power
• (trinitarians MIA)

This only changes by some time after 350, deep into the so-called “Arian” controversy, where we see two new word meanings emerge:

• trias, trinitas as singular referring terms for the tripersonal God

• theos, deus now used not only for f, s, and h, but also for t

These uses only become widespread after the enforcement of the 381 creed, the first (implicitly) trinitarian creed.

These new meanings go hand-in-hand with a new idea. Stung by constant accusations of tritheism (the Nicene adherent holds that each of three different beings has all it takes to be a god)–see the works of Basil on this–they urged that somehow the Person are, or are all “in” one and the same god.

On this see my free online published paper: “When and How in the History of Theology Did the Triune God Replace the Father as the Only True God?” Theologica 4:2 (2020).

Their claim was highly obscure then, and clashed with Scripture, and things haven’t changed down to this day. But NT theology stands just fine on its own.